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In the late 1990s the Korean government made many welfare expansion reforms, while
Japanese government adopted the retrenchment social policy. This contrast implies that
Welfare Orientalism should come to an end. Uncritical adoption of regime theory to
non-European countries has many problems. In order to understand the Japan’s wel-
fare state regime exactly, I propose the definition of “welfare state”: welfare state as
national goal (welfare politics), welfare state as provider (redistributive structure)
and welfare state regulator (regulatory structure). After that, I will try to identify the
characteristics of Japan’s regime. It is characterized as a strong state bureaucracy and a
weak social democracy; a relatively low level of social expenditure and a high level of
expenditure for public works; weak social regulation and strong economic regulation.
Finally, I assert that such welfare regime is being challenged by social and economic
change at the present time.
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THE FORMATION OF THE WELFARE STATE IN KOREA AND THE END
OF WELFARE ORIENTALISM
Under the Kim Dae Jung administration, which promoted the slogan of
“productive welfare,” Korea rapidly became a welfare state (Kim, 2001;
Song, 2003; Lee, 2004). A reform of public assistance was carried out and the
National Basic Livelihood Security (NBLS) Act was passed. As a result, the
number of people eligible to receive assistance rapidly expanded. Reforms
of social insurance also made progress. The National Pension insurance was
expanded to cover all citizens and thus universal pension scheme was real-
ized. Furthermore, medical insurances were integrated into one scheme and
the solidarity element — redistribution — of social insurance was strength-
ened. Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance and Employment
Insurance were also greatly strengthened. As a result of these reforms of the
various systems, a rapid increase in social expenditure was seen and it is
said that the Korean welfare state is currently in the middle of an “ultra-fast
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expansion”(Lee, 2004).
The “Korean welfare state dispute” was fought over the current state of
these social policies in Korea. At one end of the spectrum are the people
who assert that at the end of the 1990s Korea rapidly became a welfare state
and strengthened state responsibility in the adverse circumstances of the
IMF crisis, and at the other end of the spectrum are the people who assert
that Kim Dae Jung’s “productive welfare” is a part of the neo-liberal
reforms conforming to the IMF scenario and cannot be said to be an expan-
sion of state responsibility. Both views have some merit, but it cannot be
denied that Korean social policies are completely different now compared to
ten years ago. This transformation was largely due to the political posture of
the Kim Dae Jung government and the trend toward democratization which
gave birth to this government, but it cannot be denied that there were also
objective factors in the background encouraging the formation of a welfare
state, such as economic development and the aging of the population, etc.
Formation of a welfare state in Korea in this way has an important mean-
ing with respect to comparative studies on the welfare state at least in two
aspects. The first is with respect to international comparative studies in gen-
eral terms and the second is with respect to Japan-Korea comparative stud-
ies. Of course these two are related.
Looking at Japan-Korea comparative studies, it can be seen that trends in
the approach of the Government of Korea at the end of the 1990s contrast
with trends in the approach of the Government of Japan in the same period.
With global capitalism on the offensive in the 1990s, Japan’s economic poli-
cies failed to adapt to the demands of global capitalism (“lost decade”) and
social policies exemplified general principles concerning globalization and
the welfare state (“race to the bottom”). On the contrary, Korea adopted eco-
nomic policies based on IMF’s demands to adapt to globalization, and
achieved success in a relatively short period of time (“early graduation from
the IMF Program”). However, as stated above, it adopted social policies that
deviated from the doctrines of neo-liberalism.
In many previous international comparisons, Japan and Korea were
thought to be very similar countries. However, faced with the same situa-
tion — the pressure of global capitalism — the governments of the two
countries exhibited very contrasting behavior. This evokes memories of the
governments of the UK and France, separated only by the Straits of Dover,
adopting contrasting prescriptions to confront the “crisis of the welfare
state” at the beginning of the 1980s (Takegawa, 1999). Of course, both Japan
and Korea are at a different stage of development of the welfare state, thus
one should be beware of making too straight forward a comparison.
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However, it must at least be recognized that the policy vectors of the two
countries were opposed.1
The view that Japan and Korea are essentially the same has some influ-
ence in comparative welfare state studies because trends toward a certain
type of orientalism are dominant. I call the trends toward orientalism in
welfare sociology “welfare orientalism.”2 These trends are, firstly, the
Swedocentric trend which sees Sweden as a model and all other countries as
a deviation from it; secondly, the Eurocentric trend which carries out
detailed studies of differences between the European countries and empha-
sizes the similarity of countries other than the European countries;3 and
thirdly, the ethnocentric trend which thinks of social phenomena seen in
other countries as essential elements of the culture in that countries. As a
result of this kind of welfare orientalism, the “Confucian welfare state,” the
“East Asian regime” and other similar types of welfare state are constructed.
The experience of the formation of the welfare state in Korea at the end of
the 1990s made the rejection of this kind of welfare orientalism imminent.
It is no overstatement to say that concerning the defining features of
Japan’s welfare state Esping-Anderson’s paradigm (1990) has been influen-
tial. The question of which welfare (state) regime Japan belongs to — social
democratic, conservative or liberal — is being asked and the dispute over
the answer to the question is growing (Uzuhashi, 1997). Esping-Andersen
(1990) himself positioned Japan as a type of conservative regime based on
the value of the de-commodification score but recently he has asserted that
Japan is a hybrid of the liberal and conservative regimes. Nobody thinks
that Japan belongs to social democratic regime, but some people assert that
Japan belongs to liberal regime.
The significance of the Esping-Andersen’s regime theory is not that he
formulates the indices of de-commodification and identifies three regimes
based on them. The significance of it is that he positioned de-commodifica-
tion as the most important characteristic of the welfare state when seen in its
relationship to the capitalist system, moved away from the traditional
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pressure on social policies. When international organizations such as the IMF and the World
Bank intervened, that pressure strengthened. On this point, Korea was an exception to global-
ism.
2 The use of the phrase “Welfare Orientalism” was first adopted by Goodman, White and
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methodology which had a tendency to rely entirely on the utilization of
cross-sectional macro data, and carried out analyses of comparative studies
of the welfare state that went as far as analyses of the history and structure
of Western European society. Consequently, the three regimes theory has no
relationship to welfare orientalism as long as it is applied to Europe or the
US. However, if it is mechanically applied to other countries, it will be
affected by welfare orientalism.
Many studies on East Asian welfare regimes begin by asking which of the
three regimes Japan and Korea belong to. However, it is not the correct way
to apply the welfare regimes theory. This approach contains many theoreti-
cal problems. Japan’s social insurance system was built based on the
German model, thus Japan’s system is a system similar to the conservative
regime, and since the Korea social security system was built with reference
to the Japanese system, the Japanese and Korean systems are also similar.
However, this superficial similarity can be explained by diffusion and can-
not be inherently explained by the social structure of each country. This is
because the infrastructure of social policies, for example, industrial rela-
tions, the labor market, corporate governance, political structure, etc. is
completely different in each of these countries. What must be done first is to
analyze the welfare state in the context of the structure and history of the
society in which it is placed. This is the correct way to apply the welfare
regimes theory. If we make this our starting point, we must conclude that
the question of which of the three regimes Japan belongs to is a false ques-
tion.
DEFINITION OF THE WELFARE STATE
The objective of this paper is to move away from welfare orientalism and
define the characteristics of Japan’s welfare state regime. Before studying
this issue in detail, however, it is necessary to clarify the definition of the
term “welfare state.” Because social phenomena have unlimitedly diverse
aspects, if the subject is not clearly stipulated, there is a possibility of ending
up with arbitrary classifications, and if this happens, it is difficult to identify
characteristics that distinguish Japan’s welfare state regime from others.
The term “welfare state” is often used in everyday conversation. In such
cases, it has the meaning of “a state that is aware of its responsibility for the
welfare of the people and is making efforts to meet that responsibility.” This
understanding of the term is not mistaken, but this definition is insufficient
from the perspective of sociological investigation. It is necessary to theoreti-
cally refine the definition to some extent. 
172 DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIETY 
In the history of sociological thought on welfare, the following three
approaches to understanding the subject of the specialized term “welfare
state” have existed within social sciences to date:
• Welfare State as National Goal
• Welfare State as Provider
• Welfare State as Regulator
Of these three, national goal is the normative concept of welfare state, and
the welfare state as provider and the welfare state as regulator are analytical
concepts. These usages correspond to the three aspects of welfare state.
Welfare State as National Goal
As can be imagined from the fact that the origin of the term “welfare
state” was a description of the national goal of the UK as it confronted the
authoritarian state of Nazi Germany, the concept of “welfare state” original-
ly started out as a normative concept. For this reason, even when the term
“welfare state” is used separately from the historically unique context of the
UK, this normative element remains. The work of justifying “welfare state”
remains one of the most important issues in social philosophy to this day.4
Nonetheless welfare state studies that place the focus on the relationship
with the welfare state as national goal do not only belong to the sphere of
normative theories. They also belong to the sphere of empirical studies.
That is the sphere of welfare politics which develops by linking the values
and norms assumed by the welfare state to the interests of actually existing
social groups and organizations. This is also the subject of comparative wel-
fare state studies. Hence, the constellation of political ideology and political
power becomes the topic of investigation.
Welfare State as Provider
The welfare state, which initially was born as the national goal of the UK,
brought forth a variety of social policies after the Second World War includ-
ing Beveridges’ social security and Bevan’s socialized health care. However,
these policies also were not phenomena specific to the UK; they were uni-
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issue in detail, but the values and norms of the welfare state can be concentrated in solidarity
and recognition (Takegawa, 2000). The former primarily takes the form of the system of welfare
state as provider described later in this paper. The latter takes the form of the system of wel-
fare state as regulator.
versal phenomena seen in all the countries of Europe. In this way, the wel-
fare state as an actually existing system was a state that provided various
social benefits to the people. Welfare State as Provider had the effect of
redistributing income. After this, the following concerns began to be
expressed about the system of the welfare state as provider. What kinds of
benefits is the welfare state providing? What scale of redistribution is the
welfare state carrying out? And what is the nature of the redistribution car-
ried out by the welfare state?
In the previous studies, comparisons of the social security system have
dealt with the first question. In the case of Japan, it was necessary to study
the social security systems of the developed countries in the process of
forming the welfare state so that there were many attempts to introduce the
various social policy systems of the developed countries of Europe and the
US among not only government administrators but also legal scholars,
political scientists, economists, and sociologists.5 Quantitative political sci-
ence and political sociology studies since Wilensky (1975) have dealt with
the second question. The size of social expenditure was made the dependent
variable and attempts were made to find an independent variable with a
strong explanatory power. The theory of types of welfare state since Esping-
Andersen (1990) has dealt with the third question. Under the capitalist sys-
tem established on the assumption of the commodification of labor, the
question of the extent to which the de-commodification of labor is advanced
in the welfare state through the redistribution becomes an object of research.
Welfare State as Regulator
The welfare state uses a variety of regulatory activities as a method to
realize its values and norms. Regulation means that legitimate authority
prohibits or restricts certain actions of organizations or individuals. As may
be deduced from the fact that one of the first laws in the social policy field
was the Factory Law, social policy regulation has a long history. However,
in the history of comparative welfare state studies, interest in the welfare
state as regulator has not necessarily always occupied a fair position, with
the exception of the introduction of the various labor legislations. The rea-
son for this is that unlike social benefits, which can be denominated in mon-
etary terms, social regulation cannot easily be put into operation, Calization
difficult to be it the subject of quantitative sociological comparative studies.
Intervention in the labor market and in industrial relations is the tradi-
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tional form of social policy. As it is necessary to ensure a stable labor mar-
ket, all the capitalist states carry out this form of social regulation. However,
these days, regulations not only for working hours and wages but also con-
cerning the equalization of employment opportunities are essential, because
such regulations are the assumption of the recognition of social minorities.
Also, intervention in the family (for example, domestic violence, abuse of
children or the elderly, etc.) has come to be acknowledged as a social policy
of the welfare state, and comparative studies in this field should be
advanced further.
Studies concerning the regulatory state can complement the knowledge of
comparative studies of the provider state. This is because welfare states that
are excellent providers are not necessarily excellent regulators. For example,
under the conservative regime the level of social expenditure is high, but
the gender equity with respect to employment opportunities is not necessar-
ily advanced. Conversely, even if the welfare state is a poor provider, it is
possible for it to be excellent as a regulator. For example, although the level
of social expenditure in the US is not high, its social regulation is advanced.
Social benefits are a positive sanction in the sense that they confer a direct
benefit on the people who receive the benefits, whereas social regulation is a
negative sanction in the sense that it directly imposes a liability on the people
subject to regulations. The welfare state aims to realize values and norms
(solidarity and recognition) through these two methods. So, where is the
performance of the welfare state sought?
The performance of the welfare state must be considered in relation to an
environment which impedes the realization of the values and norms (soli-
darity and recognition) of the welfare state. As implied by the study by
Esping-Andersen (1990), the first environment for the welfare state is the
capitalist system. Here the point of interest is the extent to which the com-
modified labor market is to be de-commodified. There is no need to dwell
on this point. As implied in the feminist criticism of Esping-Andersen
(1990), patriarchy is also part of the environment of the welfare state
(Sainsbury, 1994). Patriarchy hampers solidarity and recognition. The exis-
tence of patriarchy is made possible by the reproduction of gendered social
relations. The welfare state assumed the male breadwinner model at the
time of its establishment in the middle of the 20th century. For this reason,
the social policies of the welfare state could function by gendering social
relations, but, on the other hand, it was also possible to de-gender these
policies by making the tax system and social security apply to individuals
and equalizing opportunities in the labor market. It is necessary to evaluate
the performance of the welfare state from a number of angles in this way.
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Using these three concepts of the welfare state instead of Esping-
Andersen’s three world theory, we can understand Japan’s welfare-state
better. Building on the work above, if the characteristics of Japan’s welfare-
state regime are presented in advance, they look like the following.
• Welfare State as National Goal
→Welfare politics → weakness of social democracy and strength
of the state bureaucracy 
• Welfare State as Provider
→ Redistribution structure → low level of social expenditure and
high level of public works
• Welfare State as Regulator
→ Regulatory structure → weakness of social regulation and
strength of economic regulation
DE-POLITICIZED WELFARE POLITICS: THE WEAKNESS OF SOCIAL
DEMOCRACY AND THE STRENGTH OF THE STATE BUREAUCRACY
The labor movement and social democratic political parties played a large
role in the formation of the welfare state in the European countries. Of
course conservatives and liberals have sometimes played a certain role too,
but it has been limited compared to that of the labor movement and social
democratic political parties. One cannot even imagine a social democratic
party in the anti-welfare state, but one can imagine a conservative party in
the anti-welfare state. It is known that in general there is an inverse relation-
ship between the proportion of seats occupied in parliament by conserva-
tive parties and the size of social expenditure.
A labor movement and social democratic forces exist in Japan, too.
However the role that they played in the formation of the welfare state was
extremely limited. This is one of the characteristics of Japan’s welfare poli-
tics.
Firstly, Japan’s social democratic forces have only very rarely been in
power in the post-war period. In many countries in Europe, the government
administrations have frequently changed from conservative parties to social
democratic parties and back again and the social democratic parties have
been in power for a relatively long period of time. However, in Japan’s case,
in the 50 years of the second half of the 20th century, social democrats have
only made up a part of the Cabinet for a total of three or four years.
Furthermore, most of the periods in office by social democrats lasted less
than one year. This being the case, even if the social democratic forces had
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desired to form a welfare state, it would have been difficult for them to real-
ize one.
Secondly, Japan’s social democratic forces did not place importance on
enhancing social policies within their policy framework. Within the Cold
War structure, security issues were the focus of confrontations between the
ruling and opposition parties. These issues included whether to maintain
the alliance with the US and whether the existence of the Self-Defense
Forces was acceptable.6 Social security issues such as the pension and health
care, etc. took a back seat to security issues. Japan’s social democratic forces
tended to downplay the “welfare state” political symbol because they
thought that it would mislead the people. Rather, up until the beginning of
the 1970s it was the conservative parties7 that used this symbol in order to
oppose communism. Far from supporting the introduction of the welfare
state, there were even times when the labor movement and the social demo-
cratic parties launched campaigns to oppose social security systems that the
government was trying to introduce.
Thirdly, it was the state bureaucracy that promoted the formation of
Japan’s welfare state instead of the weak social democratic forces. In a sense,
Japan’s state bureaucracy has played a role of quasi-social democracy. There
are a number of epoch-making years in the process of the formation of
Japan’s welfare state, including universal medical care and pension in 1961,
the first year of welfare in 1973, the basic pension in 1985, the enactment of
the Long-Term Care Insurance Law in 1997, etc. However, all of these
reforms were realized under the leadership of the state bureaucracy and the
role of the social democratic forces in the process of their establishment was
limited.8 In the same way, the state bureaucracy played a large role in
reforms concerning labor-related legislation. 
The Conservative Party, which monopolized power for a long period,
showed its acceptance of this virtual social democracy practiced by the state
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6 The Constitution of Japan states that “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war poten-
tial, will never be maintained.”
7 In Japan, the Liberal Democratic Party has been the ruling party for long period. In this
paper I call this party as conservative party, because its political orientation is not liberal but
conservative.
8 However, in the background of the first year of welfare in 1973 were the so-called
reformist authorities — local authorities controlled by leaders put in place by the Socialist
Party of Japan and the Japanese Communist Party — who put pressure on the central govern-
ment to carry out social security reforms. In that sense, the social democratic forces certainly
played a role. Even in this case, it was not that the state bureaucracy bowed to the pressure of
the reformist authorities and reluctantly promoted reforms; rather, it can be said that the state
bureaucracy used the pressure of the reformist authorities to realize its own objectives.
bureaucracy. The Japanese conservative parties reacted sensitively to securi-
ty issues and issues that hurt nationalist and patriotic sentiment but they
were generally unconcerned by policy formulation by the state bureaucracy
with respect to other issues. They were not so much concerned with policy
itself as with the interests accruing from the policy implementation process.
Therefore, as long as social policy was positioned within a framework for a
mechanism to distribute its interests, the conservative parties had little rea-
son to oppose it.
In this way, Japan’s welfare state was de facto formed by the state bureau-
cracy with the acceptance of the conservative parties and, on the other hand,
although the social democratic forces made the mistake of opposing the
enhancement of social security on occasion, given the political concepts on
which they were founded, they had to support the welfare state in the end.
For this reason, the “welfare” as a political symbol is accepted across the
political spectrum in Japan. Conservatives in the US and the UK staunchly
argue against welfare. The argument concerning the dependent class and
the underclass is a manifestation of this debate. In Japan, however, conserv-
ative politicians also advocate welfare when fighting elections. This is espe-
cially true of local authorities. In the first half of the 1980s, the rhetoric of
Japanese-style welfare society theory appeared in Japan’s welfare politics.
This can be considered as be the Japanese version of neoconservative phras-
es such as Reaganomics and Thatcherism. However, there is one decisive
difference between the two. That difference, as indicated by Shinkawa
(1993), is that in Japan the anti-welfare content is discussed in pro-welfare
terms.
As a result of all of these facts, welfare politics in Japan tends to become
less visible. Of course a conflict of interests concerning social policies exists
in Japan, too. The opposition between labor and capital concerning the pro-
portion of the social insurance contribution that each should pay and the
opposition between doctors and health insurance societies over medical fee
are the most prominent. Moreover, many conflicts of interest are brought
into the state bureaucracy. The opposition between the Ministry of Finance
and the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare over social security is a typ-
ical example. For this reason, a kind of virtual welfare politics is carried out
within the state bureaucracy. However, this leads to welfare politics that are
becoming more submerged. This is because most conflicts of interest are
sorted out within the state bureaucracy and rarely are presented clearly to
the people.9 Therefore, conflicts of interest over social policies never devel-
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op into political disputes. In Germany and France, general strikes are held
to protest government retrenchment policies in the field of social security
but in Japan’s case, such strikes rarely occur. If there is a large-scale public
political conflict, it is not about social security but about national security. If
I may state without fear of being misunderstood, in Japan, welfare politics
have been de-politicized.
THE SPELL OF THE NATIONAL BURDEN: THE LOW LEVEL OF SOCIAL
EXPENDITURE AND THE HIGH LEVEL OF EXPENDITURE FOR PUBLIC
WORKS
The level of social expenditure in Japan is relatively low among the OECD
countries. Table 1 shows gross social expenditure as a percentage of the
GDP in the major countries. From this table it can be seen that Japan is at
about the same level as the US (liberal regime) and at a considerably lower
level than Sweden (social democratic regime) and Germany (conservative
regime). It is known that in general the aging of a population is a factor
causing an increase in social expenditure, and since the level of aging in
Japan is low compared to these countries, it is possible that the low level of
social expenditure in Japan is being overrated. However, even if the level of
aging is controlled, it remains true that Japan has a low level of social
expenditure compared to these countries.
This is a puzzle. Why is the level of social expenditure low in spite of the
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TABLE 1. SOCIAL EXPENDITURE AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP (1997) %
Japan Germany Sweden UK US
Gross public social expenditure 15.1 29.2 35.7 23.8 15.8
Net total social expenditure 15.7 28.8 30.6 24.6 23.4
Source: Willem Adema, “Net Social Expenditure — 2nd Edition (Labour Market and Social Policy
Occasional Paper No. 52)” submitted to the Employment, Labour and Social Affairs
Committee of the OECD, August 2001, extract from Table 7.
reform was one of the issues disputed in the 2003 general election. Nonetheless, this does not
mean that detailed policy debates were carried out; the subject of pension reform was simply
mentioned in general terms. In November 2003, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of
Economy, Trade and Industry publicly opposed the reform plan of the Ministry of Health,
Labour and Welfare, meaning that dissension within the state bureaucracy was presented
clearly to the people. However, even in this case, it was largely a dispute about conditions
within the framework established by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. It will be
necessary to watch future developments carefully to determine whether this incident will
mark the beginning of a change in Japan’s welfare politics.
fact that the “welfare” political symbol has been accepted by the whole pop-
ulation of Japan to such an extent that welfare politics have been “de-politi-
cized”? One of the keys to solving this puzzle is the politics of the “national
burden.”
In Japan the national burden is expressed in terms of just one index: the
national burden ratio. This figure is obtained by dividing the sum of the tax
payment and the social security contributions by national income. The theo-
retical basis for this index is poor and it is not acceptable by international
standards, but within Japan it is used extremely often. Since the beginning
of the 1980s, successive governments have made curbing the national bur-
den ratio one of their fundamental policy goals. Furthermore, the opposi-
tion parties have also supported this policy. A large section of the mass
media critical of the government has also supported it. The phrase “welfare
rollback” is not permitted to exist within Japan’s welfare politics, but the
debate is structured in such a way that the phrase “alleviation of the nation-
al burden” can act as a de facto substitute for it.
Already, many people have pointed out that Japan’s social expenditure is
relatively low. However, just understanding this point is not the same as
having an accurate grasp of the characteristics of the welfare state as
provider. This is because even if total social expenditure is low, it does not
necessarily mean that expenditure is low on average for each item of expen-
diture. Looked at in terms of international comparisons, Japan’s social
expenditure varies considerably between each item. I will discuss this point
briefly.
The level of universal benefits such as pensions, medical care, etc. is rela-
tively high in Japan. The income replacement rate of the public pension
looked at in terms of international comparisons is not necessarily low. It is
lower than Sweden’s replacement rate, but on the other hand is actually
higher than replacement rates in Germany and the UK. Also, total expendi-
ture on the pension is relatively high (in other words, the pension accounts
for a remarkably high percentage of total social security expenditure). If the
system matures even further due to the aging of society, it is certain that
pension benefits will increase even more.
The level of national medical care expenditure in Japan along with the UK
is low among the OECD countries, but the level of health of the people of
Japan is by no means low. Inputs may be small but outcomes are big. The
traditional social indicators concerning health, for example, the life
expectancy at birth and the infant mortality rate, are the best or the second-
best in the world. Japan’s “actual life expectancy,” which has been gaining a
lot of notice in recent years, is by no means short either.
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The fact that the level of pensions and medical care is not so poor even
though total social expenditure is relatively low means that other benefits
are feeling the strain. This point can be confirmed in Table 2, which shows
an international comparison of social security expenditure by functional cat-
egory. Since the low figures for “Unemployment” in this table can to some
extent be explained by a low unemployment rate (because there is little
necessity for benefits), it cannot be concluded that the level of unemploy-
ment-related benefits is low. However the disparities in the “Invalidity ben-
efits” and “Employment injury,” “Family benefits,” “Housing” and “Social
assistance” columns are undeniable. Of these, “Family benefits” and “Hous-
ing” are the result of flaws in the system. The former is due to an inade-
quate family allowance (child benefit) and the latter due to the lack of a
housing benefit (rent allowance scheme). The low level of “Invalidity bene-
fits,” “Employment injury” and “Social assistance” means that benefits for
special needs and selective benefits are being neglected as a result of the pri-
ority being given to universal benefits. 
The uneven development between different categories of social expendi-
ture shown above is only half of the story regarding the welfare state as
provider in Japan. The other half is the fact that spending on public works is
extremely high. The ratio of “general government public capital formation”
(IG) to GDP, said to be an indicator of the size of spending on public works,
is by far higher in Japan than in other OECD countries (as shown in table 3).
It is also higher in Korea than in the European countries or the US, and the
inclination to spend money on public works can be said to be common to
Japan and Korea but Japan has an even higher rate than Korea.10 As a result
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TABLE 2. INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF SOCIAL SECURITY EXPENDITURE BY FUNC-













injury benefits and others
Japan(1996) 7.43 1.39 0.44 0.28 6.46 0.49 0.57 0.03 0.36 17.46
USA(1995) 6.92 0.68 0.68 4.34 – 0.34 0.44 3.04 16.43
Germany(1996) 11.39 3.68 2.08 0.61 11.12 3.40 3.36 0.23 1.82 37.68
Sweden(1996) 16.03 1.10 5.26 9.68 4.68 4.51 1.39 1.38 44.00
Source: The Cost of Social Security in Japan, The National Institute of Population and Social Security
Research (http://www.ipss.go.jp/ss-cost/e/cost02/6e/No6e.htm, May 3, 2005)
10 In recent years Japan’s spending for public works have been declining and in 2000 the
rate in Korea was higher than in Japan.
of public works by the government, the percentage of the total work force
working in the construction industry was higher than in other countries.
This large amount of spending on public works is effective as a factor in
bringing down social expenditure under certain conditions.
Firstly, public works have a positive effect on employment creation so
that to some extent they can prevent unemployment and poverty. Some
economists estimate that Japan’s construction labor market is carrying a
redundant labor force of a million workers, but this fact also tells us how
much unemployment the construction labor market is absorbing. This
means that a large amount of public expenditure on employment insurance
and public assistance is being saved.
Nonetheless, workers participating in the construction industry constitute
only about 10% of the total work force and the majority of them are men.
Therefore, the ability of public works to directly reduce social expenditure is
limited. However, when a second condition — the sexual division of labor
— is added to the mix, the ripple effect is huge. When the male breadwinner
model is dominant, securing employment for men means preventing not
only male poverty and unemployment but also female poverty and unem-
ployment. Furthermore, full employment of male workers leads to the sta-
ble supply of unpaid domestic labor which leads to savings on social bene-
fits related to care (functional social security categories such as “Invalidity
benefits” and “Family benefits,” etc.). In fact, for a long time the Japanese
family took the form of a modern patriarchy. There is no room for doubt
about this (Osawa, 1993). It is certain that a mechanism that reduced social
expenditure through public works was effective (Okazawa and Miyamoto,
1997).
In Japan’s case, a policy framework giving priority to public works was
established before the welfare state. The formation of the welfare state as
provider took place in 1973 and social expenditure in Japan began to
increase rapidly from this year onward. However, in the preceding era of
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high economic growth there had been calls for the enhancement of infra-
structure in order to correct the social imbalance that was appearing as a
result of rapid industrialization and urbanization, and by the beginning of
the 1960s, importance was being placed on public works in the economic
plans and national land plans formulated by the government. Furthermore,
public works were allocated to each region in the name of eliminating the
dual structure of Japan’s economy and promoting the development of
underdeveloped regions. As a result, the allocation of public works became
important task for politicians and because this allocation became linked to
vote-gathering at elections, public works became an indispensable element
of Japan’s political structure.11 Japan’s welfare state had to be formed predi-
cated on this framework.
This conferred one more characteristic on the redistribution structure of
Japan’s welfare state, namely, that priority is given to horizontal redistribu-
tion rather than vertical redistribution, or, in other words, to redistribution
between regions rather than between social classes. That means that Japan,
rather than provide social benefits to low income strata of society, tried to
achieve the same effect by carrying out public works in underdeveloped
regions.12 In Japan, this mechanism was very effective.
Let us sum up. Japan’s social expenditure is low compared to the other
OECD countries. This does not result from low levels of universal benefits
such as pensions or medical care, etc.; it is a result of the low levels of other
kinds of benefits. The large amount of spending on public works leads to
the existence of gendered families and in this way produces a low level of
non-universal benefits (uneven development of the structure of social
expenditure) and gives rise to a relatively low level of social expenditure.
The fact that priority is given to redistribution between regions through
public works rather than to redistribution between social classes through
social benefits is another reason why social expenditure is relatively low.
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11 The normal division of responsibilities between the political party and the bureaucracy —
in which politicians are responsible for the general policy direction and the bureaucracy is
responsible for working out the details — was reversed. The state bureaucracy decided the
overall framework of public works, but the allocation of each project was decided by political
parties, meaning that the bureaucracy was responsible for the general policy direction but
politicians were responsible for working out the details. In this way, bureaucrats conducted
politics (decided policies) and politicians carried out administration (allocated projects).
12 Tax system also contributed to redistribution of wealth between regions.
THE PARADOX OF THE CONVOY SYSTEM: THE STRENGTH OF
ECONOMIC REGULATION AND THE WEAKNESS OF SOCIAL
REGULATION
The work of defining the characteristics of the welfare state as regulator
has not made sufficient progress within comparative welfare state studies to
date, but we can get pointers concerning economic regulation from modern
capitalist theory. Theories have been advanced about organized capitalism,
state-monopoly capitalism, the mixed economy system, etc., and what these
kinds of theories all have in common is that they indicate that 20th century
capitalism, unlike 19th century capitalism, is founded on the assumption of
various forms of state intervention.
To date, modern capitalist theories were often presented as stage theories
of capitalism but in recent years the trend is for modern capitalist theories to
be developed in terms of theories of types rather than in terms of stage theo-
ries. For example, Albert (1991) classifies capitalism into Anglo-Saxon and
Rhine types and indicates that under the former approach market mecha-
nisms are applied more widely and intervention by the government is
stronger than under the latter approach. This is a typical example of under-
standing capitalism in terms of types. In addition, distinctions have been
made between the “liberal market economy” and the “coordinated market
economy” (Hall and Soskice, 2001), and between “liberal capitalism” and
“non-liberal capitalism” (Streeck and Yamamura, 2001).
All of these theories of types of capitalism attribute the same characteris-
tics to Japan’s capitalism. According to these theories, Japan’s capitalism,
along with Germany’s, is the polar opposite of that in the US, and it is gen-
erally stated that Japan’s capitalism is the type of capitalism which features
strong regulation by government. Some people assert that Japan is a liberal
welfare state, the same as in the US, but nobody says that Japan’s capitalism
is the liberal type seen in the US. To that extent there is an established theo-
ry concerning the strength of economic regulation by the government of
Japan. 
In Japan’s case, state intervention in an area of the economy appeared
firstly in the form of protection and nurturing of high-growth sectors. The
government of Japan has followed a policy of wide-ranging economic inter-
vention, including not only regulatory measures but also benefit measures
in order to give preferential treatment to and expand highly productive sec-
tors with the potential to strengthen their international competitiveness. The
metaphor “Japan Inc.” has been used to describe this method of interven-
tion. The head office — in other words, the Ministry of International Trade
184 DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIETY 
and Industry — oversees the branch offices, in other words, each company
in Japan, based on the economic strategy of prioritized allocation of funds to
the most promising sectors. What was considered promising varied depend-
ing on the historical period. It might be the coal industry or it might be the
steel industry. Or, it might be the automobile industry or the computer
industry. However, the government policy of concentrated investment in
vital industries remained unchanged.
This does not mean that the government of Japan abandoned low-growth
sectors. On the contrary, the opposite is the truth. The government of Japan
did not only protect and nurture high-growth sectors, but it also provided
considerable protection and assistance to low-growth sectors with poor
competitiveness (for example, agriculture and the distribution industry,
etc.). The “convoy system” is a typical expression of this method of state
intervention. This approach directly originated from banking supervision
carried out using the weakest bank as the standard so that no bank would
go bankrupt, but it was applied not only to the banking industry, but was
applied to every industry in the Japanese economy. 
Under Sweden’s active labor market policies, sectors with low productivi-
ty were reorganized and redundant labor was absorbed into sectors with
high productivity in order to develop a more advanced industrial structure,
but in Japan’s case this did not happen. This is because in Japan sectors with
low productivity were also protected, and they continued to exist and gen-
erate a certain amount of employment even after they were no longer com-
petitive. Both Japan and Sweden are known as countries with low unem-
ployment rates but their methods of achieving them were exactly opposite.
Because of this security of employment, employees came to work for a
long time in the same company. As a result, employers provided them a
wide range of employee benefit plans. Especially lump sum retirement
allowances and company housing were important in terms of the size and its
functions. Occupational welfare schemes substituted for social expenditure.
The distinctive characteristic of Japan’s regulatory approach is that social
regulation, in contrast to the strength of economic regulation, is not neces-
sarily strong. 
Dismissal of workers by employers is relatively strongly regulated so that
once a worker has acquired regular employment the risk of unemployment
is small.13 However, the fact is that in Japan regulations to equalize employ-
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13 One more exception is the Land and House Lease Law. The security of tenure of the ten-
ant is relatively strongly protected. However, this should be thought of in light of the lack of a
housing benefit.
ment opportunities in the labor market are generally weak. Employment
discrimination for reasons of ascription (for example, sex, age, ethnicity, etc.)
has been neglected in Japan for many years. As a part of the process of rati-
fying the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women, the Equal Employment Opportunity Law
was enacted, but gender discrimination in recruiting, hiring, deployment
and promotion was not finally prohibited until amendment of the law in
1997. Before that, these forms of discrimination were neglected. Concerning
discrimination based on age, the fact is that in general this is essentially not
even recognized as discrimination partly due to the effect of social norms
that evaluate people based on age. Sufficient regulatory measures concern-
ing employment opportunities for social minorities have not been taken,
and the UN has recommended that Japan make improvements in this area.
The situation is the same for social regulation of the lives of the people.
Urban planning is not functioning sufficiently and issues are arising with
respect to land and housing. Regulations on the use of land are insufficient,
and the cities of Japan are failing to achieve proper zoning. No legal mea-
sures have been taken to prohibit age discrimination or discrimination
against foreigners with respect to rental accommodation. Regulations con-
cerning domestic violence are also insufficient. Measures against abuse of
children and the elderly are also inadequate. The idea of prohibiting dis-
crimination against persons with disabilities is not generally accepted. As a
result of all these facts, the social laissez-faire situation appears in Japan even
though strong economic regulations are in place.
Japan seems to be a regulatory state in contrast with the situation in the
US. Certainly the US is a country with weak regulation. However, that is
true only for economic regulation; social regulation is quite strong. Equal
employment opportunity (EEO) laws have been developed and there are
very thorough laws in place prohibiting employment discrimination. The
same is true of social regulation of the lives of the people. More spheres of
people’s lives are left to market forces than in other countries, but the
spheres that are not left to market forces are strongly regulated.
As I indicated in the previous section, the large amount of spending on
public works is one cause of the low social expenditure in Japan, but
because public works are managed politically and administratively, they
can also cause economic regulation to be strong. More accurately, the large
number of public works and the strength of economic regulation should be
seen as two forms of state intervention of a strong state bureaucracy. Part of
the reason for full employment can be sought in the strength of this eco-
nomic regulation but, by leading to gendered families, in some cases it prob-
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ably leads to replacement of social regulation and the delayed development
of social regulation.14
JAPAN’S REGIME IN TRANSITION
Orientalist approach tends to consider that Japan and Korea belong to the
same welfare state regime. However, the social and economic policy orienta-
tions of both governments were completely opposite in the late 1990s.
Esping-Andersen’s three-world approach tends to consider that the two
countries must belong to Social Democratic, Conservative, Liberal or the
hybrid. As previously stated, however, uncritical adoption of this theory has
many theoretical problems. In order to get the exact picture of the welfare-
state regime of Japan, I used another analytical framework of the welfare
state that emphasized the three aspects of welfare state in this paper. As a
result, I made clear the six characteristics of Japan’s welfare state regime.
Now, at the beginning of the 21st century, Japan’s welfare state regime is
standing at a crossroads. This is because the various conditions that made
the above characteristics of the regime possible are being challenged by the
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following internal and external factors. 
The first factor is globalization. The fourth quarter of the 20th century was
the period in which globalization in the modern sense of the word began. In
that context, the economic policies and social policies of each country in the
world had to be adapted to US-led global capitalism (Mishra, 1999;
Takegawa, 2003). As a result, the redistribution structure and regulatory
structure of Japan’s regime are facing pressure to change.
Firstly, the redistribution structure that gives preference to redistribution
between regions rather than redistribution between social classes is becom-
ing difficult to maintain in the face of pressure from global capitalism. The
government, faced with the fear that capital will leave for overseas, must
restore fiscal discipline. For this reason, the government will be forced to
take measures to reduce not only social expenditure but also public works.
This means that redistribution to underdeveloped regions through public
works will become more difficult.
Secondly, it is becoming difficult to maintain the former strong economic
regulation in the face of pressure from global capitalism. “Japan Inc.”-style
protection policies for growth industries soon attract international criticism.
There are constant calls from overseas for the abolition of protection for
low-productivity sectors on the grounds that such protection impedes free
trade. Employment creation in its traditional form — redundant labor
absorbed by protected inefficient sectors — is becoming difficult.15 And it is
becoming difficult for private companies to provide occupational welfare as
well.
In any case, globalization has the potential to force the de-coupling of the
bond between economic policy and social policy that has existed until now
in Japan’s regime. 
The second factor is de-genderization. The replacement of social expendi-
ture with public works was more effective because the patriarchy existed,
but even in Japan the family structure which is predicated on a traditional
sexual division of labor is changing, albeit gradually. When the male bread-
winner model is no longer acceptable, it cannot be expected that the security
of lives of women will be ensured by public works and the uneven develop-
ment of the composition of social expenditure will have to be corrected.
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15 The social democratic regime aims to resolve the problem of the surplus labor force by
expanding the public sector, the conservative regime by reducing labor force supply, and the
liberal regime by expanding low-wage labor (Esping-Andersen, 1999). By contrast, in the case
of Japan’s regime, this problem has been handled through public works in underdeveloped
regions and the protection for low-productivity sectors. However, globalization is making this
difficult.
Demands for the strengthening of social regulation in the labor market will
inevitably grow.
The third factor is that there are signs of change in the political structure.
The political structure under which the state bureaucracy decided policy
and the political parties distributed the interests was maintained by the
strong growth of public works. Therefore, the suppression of public works
could bring about changes in this political structure. As a result of the struc-
ture of electoral districts being changed from multi-seat electoral districts to
single-seat electoral districts at the beginning of the 1990s, there has been a
gradual convergence toward a two-party system. If this trend continues and
changes of government begin to occur frequently, in future the relationship
between the state bureaucracy and the political parties will have to change a
lot. Moreover, because the doctrines of global capitalism are infiltrating the
state bureaucracy, it will probably become difficult for it to play the role of a
virtual social democrat as it did formerly. Due to these changes, de-politi-
cized welfare may become politicized again in future.
It can be indicated that various signs of changes to the conditions that
supported Japan’s welfare state regime have started to appear. However,
because at this point in time there is not nearly enough information avail-
able to predict whether a regime shift will occur, no strong conclusions can
be drawn. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that Japan’s welfare state regime is
currently standing at a crossroads.
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